The Russian revolutions were undoubtedly a culmination of a gradual build-up of pressure on Tsarism, with political and economic tensions having developed since 1825. On the eve of the February Revolution, the Russian economy was indeed in a dire situation, being unable to withstand the pressure of ‘Total War’ due to structural weakness which came from unsuccessful modernization. There was also a decline in political support for the Tsar which began with the Decembrist Revolt, was accelerated by the reforms of Alexander II, and was pushed to breaking point by the poor decision making of Nicholas II. Thus, while economic issues were impactful in the short term, it was political factors in the long term which led to discontent becoming a revolution in February 1917 and paved the way for the Octrobrist Revolution. Marxist historians such as Trotsky would argue that the 1917 revolutions were part of an organic process at the end of which the capitalist economic order would collapse, and therefore that political factors were less important. They were heavily influenced by ‘Das Kapital,’ and interpreted the revolutions as part of a belief in a greater economic theory. Nevertheless, Marxist historians have been criticized due to their writing at a time when their freedoms were limited due to the desire of the regime to legitimise the timing of their revolution (in particular the October Revolution). Furthermore, these historians were writing during the Cold War, where historiography was extremely politicised and access to information was limited; Russia only opened its archives in 1991. On the other hand, western (Capitalist) historians such as Service would argue that it was a build-up of unrest and tsarist errors which culminated in the two revolutions. However, the views of these historians were arguably less politically motivated than Marxists due to their work being largely independent. Additionally, many western historians were writing after the Russian archives were opened and arguably had a wider and more well-informed view. However, historians such as Timasheff have also been accused of having been influenced by the Cold War – an explanation for his anti-communist stance. Western historians are also divided in their views of the causes of the revolutions, classified as being either Optimist or Pessimist. Pessimist historians such as Figes, Acton and Service argue that by 1917 revolution was inevitable due to a build-up of issues in the long term, whilst optimists such Lynch and Timasheff have a different view of the causes; they believe that Russia was stable, recovering and reformed at the outset of WW1, and instead collapsed due to the pressures of the war. Robert Service offers a pessimistic view of the Revolutions in A History of Modern Russia. Service’s background is as a British historian born in 1947, educated in Russian and Classical Greek at Cambridge University. His writing has a varied focus, improving the validity of his judgement due to his knowledge in a wide range of areas and allowing him to make sweeping statements such as ‘some kind of revolutionary clash was practically inevitable.’ Service offers a convincing argument that Nicholas’s desire to maintain autocratic power led to his being the focal point of discontent, therefore making the ‘wrong circumstances’ more likely to occur. Service believes that the incompetence of the Tsar was closely linked with the fall of the system in that his actions led to the monarchy being increasingly regarded as an institution which failed to correspond to the country’s needs; this is made more convincing by the breadth in which he investigated the causes of the Revolutions. However, Service has also been criticised for this wide focus, being accused of making broad and counterfactual statements. In contrast, optimist historians argue that Tsarism was likely to have survived had it not been for the events of WW1. Timasheff, in contrast to Service, strongly argues that the Tsar was still respected and ‘at the core’ of society despite some of his shortcomings. Despite acknowledging the high level of social pressure due to the actions of Tsars in ‘The Great Retreat’, he maintains that by WW1 a revolution was by no means inevitable. Here he agrees with McKean, who argues that indeed it was the strain of war on its economy that brought Russia to Revolution in 1917. However, an obvious criticism of Timasheff’s work lies in his background; his father was Minister of Trade during Nicholas II’s reign. This strong personal connection would make him more likely to paint the Tsarist regime in a positive light, as well as instil in him a deep-rooted dislike for bolshevism, something which would only have been exaggerated by his time working in the United States. Therefore, Timasheff could be accused of writing history from an anti-Bolshevik perspective. Additionally, the fact that he was writing in 1946 means that he did not have full access to the Russian archives, and thus did not have as complete a picture of events leading up to 1917 as a later historian like Service. The impact of the Edict of Emancipation (1861) could be argued to be a long term economic cause of the 1917 revolutions. While Alexander II hoped to ‘abolish from above,’ there were already pressures on the Tsar to destroy Serfdom following Russian failure in the Crimean War. Gershenkron argued that Serfdom prevented the emergence of a modern capitalist economy, creating an inelastic labour force and the lack of potential for a ‘money economy.’ Whilst this would have only been understood by the upper classes, it would nonetheless have created demands from educated Russians for reform. However, the Emancipation was extremely unsuccessful; peasants received little land, and what land they did receive was laden with debt and of poor quality. This left them too poor to invest in the land, and the economic improvements which had been hoped for were severely limited. They were further hampered by the Mir in restricting movement between areas, which maintained Gershenkron’s ‘inelastic labour force’ from prior to the Emancipation. It also upset the nobility, who were too indebted to invest in agriculture as the Tsar had hoped. Source B is effective in demonstrating this; it shows clearly how attitudes among the nobility as well as the poor debt situation led to the Emancipation being ineffective in its attempt to stimulate the modernisation of the economy, thereby creating distrust in the Tsar’s ability to make positive change. Source B is valuable when understanding the attitudes of the nobility towards serfs through its overtly critical view of the treatment of the serfs in the years preceding their emancipation (1861). The imagery of bundled groups of serfs being traded as property shows how their treatment was perceived as barbaric outside Russia, supporting the idea of Russia’s being economically and socially ‘backwards.’ This portrayal of the Russian nobility as cruel provides further evidence into the way in which there was feeling both inside and outside of Russia that change was needed, made more significant in the context of Alexander II’s justification of the Emancipation Edict that ‘it is better to liberate the peasants from above’ rather than wait for them to win it ‘from below.’ Nevertheless, the underlying value of (B) is in showing how the peasants were unable to improve their own situation by using the symbolism of the serfs being tied and passed around. This highlights the lack of incentive to modernise farming techniques and covertly points to the reasoning for Russia’s failure to modernize its economy being the restrictions on what was the largest part of its population. Another area in which (B) is particularly useful is in showing the extent to which the Russian nobility was in debt, which it does by indicating that they are willing to bet their property in return for a chance to make enough money. This is particularly valuable given the context of the failure of the Emancipation to stimulate agricultural modernisation due to the high levels of debt experienced by landowners. (B) is also valuable due to the nature of its intended audience; as a political cartoon it is intended as a commentary on how Russia is perceived from the outside (being written by a French cartoonist). This gives the source value in illustrating the extent to which Russia was perceived as socially and economically backwards in 1850. However, the value of Source B is limited in some ways. Typically of a cartoon, the purpose of the source is to exaggerate to make a political point, as is shown by its use of a hyperbolic metaphor in trading bundles of peasants. Therefore, the value to a historian is limited since the extent to which the peasants were mistreated is inflated. Overall, (B) is of significant value to a historian in providing an insight into the how Russia was viewed as economically and socially backwards by Europe, with the cruelty of the nobility towards the serfs being overt. This reinforces the idea that failure to modernize the economy was a notable cause of the discontent and anti-nobility sentiment which led to the revolutions of 1917 Pessimist historians argue that these events began a long term build-up of distrust against the Tsar and in particular any effort to make concessions or piecemeal change, arguably laying the foundations for rebel demands to become more radical by 1917. The failure of the Tsarist system to bring about effective economic reform therefore was a key factor in creating an environment in which the 1917 revolutions would have been likely to occur. However, an optimist historian would point out that, despite widespread unhappiness with the changes made, opposition still demanded economic reforms from the Tsar rather than turning against the system itself and calling for his removal. Another long term cause of the 1917 revolutions was Russia’s industrialisation under Alexander III. Industrialisation undoubtedly led to significant growth, in particular as a result of Witte’s policies; the Trans-Siberian railway was constructed, barriers to foreign investment were removed and the rouble was moved to the gold standard, improving its effectiveness in foreign exchange. As a result, budget revenues were ‘approximately doubled’ in the 1890s and the ‘money economy’ which had been missing even despite the Emancipation was created. Nevertheless, it was the minimal benefit of these reforms to ordinary Russians (some workers could not afford a ‘minimum subsistence basket’ of goods in Moscow by 1900) that could be argued to be a reason for discontent with the economy, which in the long term helped to grow anti-Tsarist sentiment. This effect was exaggerated by the urbanisation which occurred as a result of the increase in demand for factory workers; anti-government sentiment became more widespread in leading up to WW1. Also, the growth of the economy in the 1890s disguised the lack of a good welfare state in addition to reliance on foreign investment, and as such the economic downturn after 1900 caused further discontent. Pessimist historians would argue that, leading into World War I, it was this economic atmosphere of dissatisfaction with piecemeal and ineffective reforms which led to widespread calls for radical change. This was exaggerated by the economic issues created by war. The failure of the Trans-Siberian railway along with supply chain issues created shortages of food and fuel; Moscow received below half of its pre-war levels of grain (700 wagons per month compared to 2200) by 1917. Rapid inflation and eventually a huge increase in unemployment followed, leading to a notable shift in the balance and number of economic strikes. In 1915, there were only 95 economic strikes compared with 116 political ones, and yet 1916 saw 354 economic strikes and 330 political ones: an increase of over 300%. The deterioration in living standards in cities in particular which followed these issues meant they were a direct cause of the February Revolution, which began with Petrograd women striking and demanding bread. Indeed Lynch, an optimist, states that ‘the explanation for [Russia’s] slide into revolution was an economic one.’ Here, both sides of the historiographical debate recognise the importance of economic issues in causing the 1917 revolutions, although pessimist historians would argue that these were an issue before the war began, rather than being caused by the pressures which it placed upon the system. While such economic factors were a short term cause of revolution, political factors were arguably more important in causing the 1917 revolutions over the long term. The Decembrist Revolt (1825) marks the beginning of the expression of discontent relating to the idea that the Tsarist system was preventing Russia from undergoing modernization, especially after some Russians were exposed to examples of nations thriving under a less powerful monarchy during the Napoleonic wars such as Britian. Indeed, the rebels called for ‘Constantine and Constitution’; Muraviev even drafted a constitution in 1924. This showed the beginning of ideas relating to increased political freedom in Russia. Source A is effective in showing this idea; it gives a clear insight into a Decembrist’s belief that the Tsarist system in its form at the time was preventing Russia from modernizing and developing military and economic strength. The most obvious value of (A) to a historian is that it offers an insight into the motivations of the Decembrists for opposing Nicholas I. In particular the tone e.g. ‘tyrannised,’ forced to sweat,’ demonstrates how, whilst during the Napoleonic wars the Tsar was a source of national pride, the army in particular felt that he was now preventing them from improving their lives and so became disillusioned with his role. This is particularly valuable given the context of Russia being seen as politically and economically ‘backwards’ compared to Europe (as a primarily rural and agricultural society compared with urbanised, industrialising countries to the west), and therefore (A) is useful in showing how this realisation motivated the Decembrists and was a significant turning point with regards to calls for economic and social reform. Nevertheless, the more underlying value of (A) is that, in addition to wanting to improve their situation at home, (A) shows the extent to which nationalistic pride was a factor is exaggerating economic and social domestic issues in particular. The emphasis on ‘granting’ France a constitution and Russian ‘pre-eminence’ combined with the bitter tone e.g ‘chains’ shows how Bestuzhev perceives the apparent backwardness of Russia to be a source of embarrassment and as one of the main reasons for the Decembrist revolt. However, (A) does have some limitations , one of which is that Bestuzhev was actually a noble, and so whilst he does mention a ‘ruling class,’ it is not representative of the desires of the majority of the population. This is supported by the fact that many of the lesser-educated Decembrists called for ‘Constantine and Constitution whilst believing that ‘Constitution’ was the name of Constantine’s wife. As such, the value in the (A)’s purpose of representing the opinions of those against the Tsar is much less significant. Whilst (A) is limited by that fact that it represents a small section of society at the time, it still has immense value in showing how the Decembrists were motivated by a desire to modernize economically and socially; they felt unable to do this with the existing form of Tsarist government. This supports the view that the February 1917 revolution in particular was caused by long running political factors. However, to overemphasise the threat to Tsarism in 1825 would represent an overly pessimistic view. Despite the significance of these ideas being raised, there was still a disconnect between the educated leaders of the revolt and the peasant rebels, who allegedly believed that ‘Constitution’ was the wife of Constantine, thus limiting the importance of the Decembrist revolt in the long term. Furthermore, optimist historians argue that rather than turning against the Tsarist system, the revolting elites were concerned with his lack of willingness to allow liberalisation rather than with the flaws of the system as a whole. These ideas surfaced again following the Crimean war (1553-56), which led the educated elite in particular to question whether the Tsar was hindering Russia’s development. Alexander II therefore decided to ‘reform from above,’ beginning with the Edict of Emancipation (1861) and continuing with a host of other social and economic reforms. These did bring about social progress, for example the establishment of equality before the law which helped to standardise the judicial process. However, the most key reforms were those related to education; the number of primary schools grew from 8000 in 1856 to 23000 by 1880. This, accompanied by a relaxation in censorship under Golovnin, resulted in a growing class of ‘intelligensia.’ Pessimists argue that this was key to both revolutions, as it made many people aware of the more successful political systems of other nations and highlighted the areas in which Tsarism was falling short. For example, the reduced censorship allowed for the formation of groups such as ‘Land and Liberty’ and later ‘the People’s Will,’ who were responsible for the assassination of Alexander II. This reflects the huge political impact of Alexander II’s reforms post-emancipation. Whilst economic failures could be argued to be the underlying cause of the 1905 revolution (creating poor conditions and a weak military), it was actually more reflective of the growing political tension and unhappiness with the way Russia was being governed. This can be seen in the way that the rebels were pacified by the October Manifesto (30th October 1905); despite the majority of demands during Gapon’s demonstration being focused on economic issues, it was the political ‘concessions’ granted by the Nicholas II which de-escalated the situation. An optimist such as Lynch would see the state Dumas as being of little consequence due to their ineffectiveness and eventual dismissal, yet the Manifesto marked the first time where rather than giving specific concessions, a Tsar made changes which reformed the system of government itself. The Fundamental Laws (1906) did pull back on the changes introduced, but the creation of the Dumas gave the rebels of the February revolution in particular a clear view of where to direct their aims – this was the long-term political significance of the 1905 Revolution in causing the 1917 revolutions. The other underlying consequence of the 1905 Revolution was that it proved to be the end of the public perception of the Tsar as a ‘little father,’ who could always be relied upon to hold the best interests of the people. Consequently, the nature and consequences of 1905 showed that without a marked change to Nicholas II’s approach to government (which was to retain complete and total autocratic power for the Tsar), Tsarism was doomed to collapse. This showed the extent to which the reactionary actions of each Tsar as individuals was linked to the ability of the system as a whole to survive, and would support the Pessimist view that, due to the character of Nicholas II, Tsarism was doomed to fall even before the events of WW1. Source C is effective in demonstrating this through the stance that Goremykin in his representation of the Tsar takes towards the Duma, showing how the dismissive attitude of the existing government to the reform alienated those fighting for it. Source C is valuable when studying the impact of the manifesto through its overtly demeaning tone in response to the demands made by the first Duma. The emphasis of the source on issues which ‘cannot be dealt with’ by a Duma demonstrates how Goremykin wishes to make clear to the Duma that they hold only a very small amount of power despite the terms agreed in the 1905 October Manifesto. This is particularly useful in the context of the Fundamental laws having been announced only a month earlier, making explicit the extent to which the Tsar would retain autocratic power in Russia. However, the underlying value of (C) is that it further provides evidence for the way in which the government failed to establish a smooth working relationship with the Duma, preventing effective reform to the extent to which it was called for. For example, despite claiming that ministers would pay ‘special attention’ to the issue of universal primary education, the bill for this was not passed until May 1908. This increases it’s value in demonstrating how the changes made in the October Manifesto did not have as great an effect was hoped for, leading to an increase in anti-government feeling. Nevertheless, (C) is limited by its subjective nature, given the context of 1905. As a response given less than a month after the proclamation of the Fundamental Laws, Goremykin’s harsh tone could be due to a desire to support the Tsar’s very recent stance taken against the power of the Duma. This could reduce the ability of a historian to use it as evidence for the relationship between the government and Duma in the years to come, making (C) less valuable. Overall, (C) is extremely valuable as it demonstrates how the Dumas had much less power than was expected by the rebels when the October Manifesto was signed in 1905, whilst also showing the fractious relationship between the Tsar’s government and the Duma. This would support the argument that, whilst economic factors were an important cause of the 1917 revolutions, political factors also played an undeniable role in creating anti-tsarist sentiment leading to the February revolution. On one hand, Nicholas potentially had more political support in 1914 than in 1905 as Lynch argues, which supports the optimist argument that the Tsarist system of government could have been maintained if it were not for the events of WW1. This came in particular from middle class sections of society, who feared a proletarian revolt much more than they disliked the policies of the Tsar. As such, Nicholas had a base of conservative support which, in addition to Stolypin’s economic reforms, helped Russia to modernize whilst retaining the authority of the Tsar. On the other hand Treadgold points out that there is no evidence to suggest that Nicholas II had the capability to do so, and thus links the incompetence of Nicholas as an individual to the collapse of Tsarism itself. In ‘Lenin and his rivals,’ Treadgold states that the Tsar regarded good governance as ‘an ideal to be sought, but an irrelevance compared to the loyalty of the Russian people to his own person,’ showing how his blind attempts to maintain his own power as a Supreme leader came at the expense of maintaining the faith of the people in the Tsarist regime. Whilst as an American historian it is important to consider how Treadgold’s writing may have been influenced by the desire to show that Communism came about by the failure of Tsarism rather than its own merit, it is nonetheless a strong argument linking the Tsar’s weak character to the downfall of Tsarism itself. The weak character of the Tsar continued to exaggerate other issues faced due to WW1. Russian institutions were unable to bear the demands of Total War, leading the zemstvo and some businessmen to set up their own supply chains. This was due to the poor appointment of ministers by the Tsar, and crucially created an alternative form of government around which opposition could potentially be focused. Optimists argue that this strain created a viable alternative and therefore led to the February revolution (and thus the October revolution when this form of government was ultimately unsuccessful). Another example of this was his decision to take control of the Army despite its obvious weakness - arguably the most important short-term factor in the February Revolution in 1917. Despite the advice of his ministers, Nicholas assumed command (September 5, 1915) and therefore responsibility for the inevitable defeats, further decreasing his popularity. Consequently, WW1 was a catalyst for exposing the inadequacies of Tsarism and in particular the character of Nicholas II, creating the unbearable political tension which led to the 1917 revolutions. This would contrast sharply with simple calls for economic reform, since it eroded support for the idea that an autocratic Tsarist system of government was viable and ultimately changed the nature of the protests during the war. It could also be argued that, despite the obvious economic crisis, it was the actions of the Tsar in using troops to put down the demonstrations which led to protests turning into a full-scale revolution. Figes supports this view of Tsarist intervention, writing that the actions of the Petrograd garrison ‘turned the disorders… into a full scale revolution.’ Nevertheless, many of the political factors which led to the February Revolution cannot be seen to carry over to the October Revolution. In February, the urban working class and army rose up against a deeply flawed Tsar against a background of errors made by individual Tsars leading to a deep distrust of their ability to reform correctly being formed. However, these inadequacies could not be carried over to the Provisional Government, therefore the influence of political causes of the October revolution was largely developed in the short term – this being the major difference between the causes of the revolutions; by October it was the advancement of political alternatives allowed the Bolsheviks to seize power. For example, one of the main flaws of the Provisional Government according to Lynch was that it lacked legitimacy and a ‘constitutional claim upon the loyalty of the Russian people’ or ‘natural fund of goodwill.’ Despite some continuity in the problems faced by government superficially (e.g. the losing war effort), the issues which led the Bolsheviks to be successful in overthrowing the Provisional Government contrasted sharply with those which led to the collapse of Tsarism. There were numerous economic factors which contributed to the Russian Revolutions of 1917. In the long term, these were underpinned by a belief that it was the maintenance of power by the Tsarist system which was holding Russia back, preventing it from modernizing effectively and thus maximising its potential to have a more powerful than economy than most of the world. In the short term these economic factors were, on the surface, the reason that discontent built up under Nicholas II. However, the true reason for the 1917 Revolutions was an underlying political strain on the nation. This had been growing since the Decembrist revolt (1825), and reflected an increasing lack of confidence in the ability of Tsars to move Russia forward and reform in a clear and effective way, something which gradually spread down the class structure. Here the Pessimist line of argument is more convincing; these dormant issues had begun with the Decembrists, been brought to the fore by Alexander II’s post-emancipation reforms, grown by Alexander III’s attempts to pull back and been brought to breaking point by Nicholas II’s naïve attempts to cling to autocratic power despite his obvious inability to govern well. Therefore, whilst long and short term economic issues soured the mood of the Russian people as it struggled to withstand the pressures of war first in 1905 and more significantly in 1914, it was the underlying build-up of political distrust – closely linked with the individual character of the Tsar - which twice brought them to revolution in 1917.
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